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ABSTRACT 
Cognitive neuroscience defines the sense of agency as the 
experience of controlling one’s own actions and, through 
this control, affecting the external world. We believe that 
the sense of personal agency is a key factor in how people 
experience interactions with technology. This paper draws 
on theoretical perspectives in cognitive neuroscience and 
describes two implicit methods through which personal 
agency can be empirically investigated. We report two 
experiments applying these methods to HCI problems. One 
shows that a new input modality - skin-based interaction - 
can substantially increase users' sense of agency. The 
second demonstrates that variations in the parameters of 
assistance techniques such as predictive mouse acceleration 
can have a significant impact on users' sense of agency. The 
methods presented provide designers with new ways of 
evaluating and refining empowering interaction techniques 
and interfaces, in which users experience an instinctive 
sense of control and ownership over their actions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The seventh of Shneiderman’s Eight Golden Rules of 
Interface Design states that designers should strive to create 
interfaces that “support an internal locus of control” [33]. 
This is based on the observation that users “strongly desire 
the sense that they are in charge of the system and that the 
system responds to their actions”. The presence of this rule 
in Shneiderman’s list reflects the critical importance of the 
sense of control in human computer interactions. Early 
research by Rotter laid the foundations for the concept of 
locus of control [32]. In more recent years the sense of 
control - or “Experience of Agency” - has become the focus 
for a significant body of research in cognitive neuroscience 
[12, 13, 16-19, 26, 27, 35-38]. Within this literature the 
experience of agency is defined as a person’s innate sense 
of being in control of their actions and through this control 
of being responsible for, or having ownership of, the 
consequences of those actions. Researchers in this field 
have developed techniques through which the experience of 
agency can be empirically investigated. 
We believe that the experience of agency, as defined in 
cognitive neuroscience literature, is key to how people 
experience interactions with technology. In this paper we 
consider how implicit measures for the experience of 
agency can be applied in HCI research and practice. We 
provide a brief review of literature on agency and introduce 
two implicit methods through which it can be empirically 
investigated. We then describe two experiments that 
investigate the sense of agency in simple human computer 
interactions. The first experiment investigates the effect of a 
change in the input modality of an interaction on user’s 
sense of agency. It compares traditional keyboard input 
with skin or body-based input and shows that changes in 
input modality can have a substantial effect on the sense of 
agency. The second experiment investigates what happens 
when a computer assists users in achieving their goals. The 
results of this experiment suggest that up to a certain point, 
the computer can assist users whilst they still retained a 
strong sense of agency. Beyond this point users experienced 
a significant loss in their sense of agency. 
This paper makes several contributions to the field of HCI:  
1. It introduces two methods through which the sense of 
agency can be implicitly measured. 
2. It demonstrates that changes in input modalities can 
have a substantial effect on the user’s sense of agency. 
3. It demonstrates that assistance from a computer can 
have a significant effect on the user’s sense of agency.  
4. It demonstrates an experimental means of mapping the 
personal agency characteristics of an assisted interaction 
technique. 
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5. It discusses the implications of these findings and 
provides an agenda for future research in this area. 
From a more general perspective this paper demonstrates 
the benefits of applying methods derived from cognitive 
neuroscience to provide a more in depth understanding of 
interactions with technology [25]. We therefore start with a 
brief comparative review of diverse perspectives on agency 
in cognitive neuroscience and HCI literature. 
THE SENSE OF AGENCY 
Humans are agents. That is, we have the capacity to 
intentionally bring about change in the world through our 
actions. Humans also have a corresponding conscious 
experience of this capacity. This is the sense of agency. 
There is a distinction, then, between the fact of controlling 
an action and the immediate sense or experience of having 
done so. It is the experience of ourselves as agents that 
allows us to say, “I did that”. 
Neurocognitive research on the sense of agency aims to 
shed light on the processes supporting this experience. 
Broadly speaking there are two theoretical positions. One 
view focuses on the motor system and suggests that the 
sense of agency is generated by neural process dedicated to 
the initiation and control of voluntary movement [16]. In 
this view, the sense of agency is based on the result of a 
comparison between the predicted and actual sensory 
consequences of movement [16]. If this comparison reveals 
no discrepancy then ‘I’ am the agent responsible for the 
particular event.  The alternative theoretical position 
downplays the specific contribution of the motor system 
[36-38]. In this view, the sense of agency is produced by a 
more general-purpose cognitive system that monitors the 
relationship between thoughts (i.e. intentions), actions and 
their outcomes, with the mind inferring and reconstructing a 
path between conscious intention and effect [37]. Here the 
sense of agency is taken to be a reconstructive inference 
that one’s intention has caused an external event. 
Within cognitive neuroscience much of the interest in the 
sense of agency stems from the fact that degradation of this 
experience is characteristic of certain psychiatric and 
neurological disorders. One of the most striking examples is 
the passivity phenomena in schizophrenia. Here, people feel 
that their actions (and sometimes their thoughts and 
emotions) are not under their own control, and are instead 
under the control of some external force or agent. For 
example, a patient described by Mellor [23] reports, “It is 
my hand and arm that move, and my fingers pick up the 
pen, but I don’t control them.” Such reports highlight a 
profound disruption in the mechanisms supporting the sense 
of agency, the consequences of which can be immensely 
disabling. However, the sense of agency is a remarkably 
fragile and malleable experience in all of us. There are 
instances in which we feel an exaggerated sense of agency. 
For example, people have been shown to place higher bets 
when they, rather than someone else, initiate a gamble, 
despite the odds being the same. On the flip side there are 
instances, such as facilitated communication, table turning 
and Ouija boards, in which we feel a reduced sense of 
agency [36]. This malleability in the human experience of 
agency offers both opportunities and pitfalls for HCI. 
AGENCY IN HCI 
In subsequent sections we will introduce an implicit means 
of measuring the experience of personal agency. Before 
this, however, it is useful to briefly consider some of the 
diverse perspectives on agency in previous HCI research: 
Media agency: together with collaborators, Reeves and 
Nass have undertaken an extensive body of research on the 
‘Media Equation’ [31]. This work suggests that people treat 
computers as social actors [29] and respond to computers 
and other media in ways derived from their response to 
other people. In HCI, the creation of user interfaces which 
include embodied agents [5, 10] - photographs or animated 
characters - is one example of an explicit attempt to co-opt 
this response as a design resource that engages users and 
improves the interaction experience. 
Intelligent agents/interfaces: in HCI contexts, components 
of intelligent user interfaces often demonstrate autonomous 
behaviours [21]. These systems use machine learning and 
other AI techniques to either aid users’ intended actions 
(e.g. [2]) or to act on users’ behalf (e.g. [4]). Such systems 
have the potential to blur the boundaries of user and 
machine agency and are the subject of the second 
experiment reported in this paper.   
Design agency: semiotic analyses of user interfaces 
understand the designed product as a text, ‘read’ by users as 
a message from the designer. This understanding of the 
interface as the 'designer's deputy' [9] relies on the 
recognition of a design stance, in which the designer as an 
agent is recognised to have had a particular intent in the 
presentation of the product [8]. 
Agency in the laboratory: in science and technology 
studies, the status of machines in laboratories as either 
neutral instruments, or objects of human observation, draws 
attention to the way in which they have characteristics 
attributed to them through their participation in social 
processes of knowledge production and interpretation [6]. 
Suchman in particular has drawn rich connections between 
agency of robots and software agents in scientific contexts, 
and the political and philosophical implications of artificial 
intelligence, robotics and HCI [34].  
It is important at this point to highlight a significant 
difference between the concepts examined in this paper and 
those examined in prior HCI research. The Media Equation, 
for example, examines how users respond, or attribute 
characteristics, to computer and media agents. In this paper 
we do not focus on attributions of agency to other people or 
things. Instead we offer a new perspective, complementary 
to those described above, which focuses on how people 
experience their own sense of personal agency when 
interacting with technology. 
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INTENTIONAL BINDING: AN IMPLICIT METRIC 
Building on the work of Libet et al. [22], Haggard et al. 
introduced an implicit metric through which the sense of 
agency can be empirically assessed [18]. Repeated 
experiments have shown that voluntary human actions are 
associated with systematic changes in our perception of 
time. The interval between a voluntary or intentional action 
and the action outcome is typically perceived as shorter 
than the actual interval. This is illustrated in figure 1(a). If a 
person takes a simple action - e.g. they press a button - and 
this action causes an outcome - e.g. a beep - it is highly 
likely that the person will perceive their action as having 
happened later than they it actually did (action binding). 
They are also likely to perceive the outcome of their action 
as having happened earlier than it actually did (outcome 
binding). Haggard coined the term ‘Intentional Binding’ to 
describe this phenomenon as it is contingent on several 
factors. In the absence of outcomes people are found to 
more accurately report the timing of actions. For the 
temporal binding effect to occur, an action must be 
intentional and it must lead to an outcome. Under these 
conditions our perception of the timings of our own actions 
and of their outcomes become bound more closely together. 
Haggard also demonstrated that unintentional actions - e.g. 
an involuntary button press - cause changes in our 
perception of time. In this case however, the perceptual 
change tends to occur in the opposite direction (figure 1(b)). 
Now the interval between actions and outcomes is 
perceived as being longer than the actual interval. In 
experimental settings involuntary actions can be induced in 
a number of ways, ranging from transcranial magnetic 
stimulation to moving a person’s finger with a mechanical 
arm or even with a piece of string tied to their finger. 
In the years since his first experiments [18], a large number 
of studies have been undertaken which validate and build 
on Haggard’s initial observations [19, 26-28]. The scientific 
consensus is now supports the conclusion that time 
perception in voluntary actions - and the binding effects 
associated with such actions - provides a robust implicit 
metric for the sense of agency. Higher intentional binding 
values correlate to a greater sense of personal agency. 
Method 1 – the Libet Clock 
In order to investigate intentional 
binding, Haggard developed an 
empirical method though which the 
binding effect can be implicitly assessed. 
He adapted Libet’s clock method [22] 
for measuring peoples’ perceived timing 
of events. The Libet clock (figure 2) 
consists of an analogue clock face with 
an arm that rotates clockwise through a 
full cycle once every 2560ms. The clock is typically 
displayed at the centre of a screen and is quite small relative 
to the overall screen size. In our experiments for example 
the  clock is 100  pixels in  diameter  and  is  displayed on  a  
 
Figure 1: time perception in an intentional action (a), and an 
unintentional action (b). 
Action measurements 
Baseline error 
 
The participant is asked to attend to the Libet clock and 
then press the button whenever they want to. In this 
case the button press does not cause a beep. The person 
reports the time on the clock (perceived time) when 
they pressed the button. The actual time of the button 
press is also recorded. 
Baseline error = actual time - perceived time 
Active error 
 
The participant attends to the clock face and presses 
the button whenever they want to. In this case the 
button press causes a beep. The person is asked to 
report the time on the clock (perceived time) when they 
pressed the button. The actual time of the button press 
is also recorded.  
Active error = actual time - perceived time 
Outcome measurements 
Baseline error 
 
The participant attends to the clock face. On this 
occasion the person takes no action and the computer 
randomly generates a beep. The participant reports the 
time on the clock (perceived time) when they heard the 
beep. The actual time of the beep is also recorded.  
Baseline error = actual time - perceived time 
Active error 
 
The participant attends to the clock face and presses 
the button whenever they want to. In this case the 
button press causes a beep. The participant reports the 
time on the clock (perceived time) when they heard the 
beep. The actual time of the beep is also recorded. 
Active error = actual time - perceived time 
Each measure outlined above is repeated multiple times and the mean 
value for each is then used to calculate Intentional Binding. 
Intentional Binding calculations  
Action binding = action error[active] - action error[baseline] 
Outcome binding = outcome error[baseline] – outcome error[active] 
Total binding = action binding + outcome binding 
Table 1: the measurements and calculations used to assess 
Intentional Binding for an action/outcome condition, using the 
Libet Clock method. For illustrative purposes we use the 
example of a button press that causes a beep. A fixed 
action/outcome interval is used for all active trials. 
 
Figure 2:  a 
Libet Clock 
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screen with a resolution of 1920 x 1080 pixels. A person 
sits in front of the screen and is asked to report where the 
hand on the clock is pointing when certain events occur. 
The clock face is deliberately small so that the person can 
attend to the clock without making significant head or eye 
movements. Using the example of a button press, table 1 
illustrates the four measurements and the calculations used 
to measure the intentional binding effect. In the active 
conditions there is a fixed action/outcome interval for all 
trials. Each measurement is repeated multiple times 
(typically 40) and mean time perceptions errors are then 
calculated. These mean values are then used to calculate the 
action, outcome and total Intentional Binding values. 
The Libet clock method has a number of strengths and 
limitations. The most attractive feature is that it provides a 
robust measure of the total intentional binding effect. It can 
also distinguish and quantify both action and outcome 
binding. However, as it requires people to visually attend to 
a clock, this method is not suitable if the task being studied 
includes significant visual elements. It also requires four 
blocks of measures for each action/outcome condition and 
is time consuming to administer if the experimental design 
includes a large number of action/outcome conditions. 
Method 2 – Interval Estimation 
Subsequent to Haggard’s initial work, Engbert et al 
introduced interval estimation [12], a second method 
through which the sense of agency can be implicitly 
assessed. As with the Libet clock method, this method 
involves measurements of the perception of time for actions 
that cause an outcome. In this case however people are 
simply asked to give an estimate of the time interval 
between the action and outcome. Trials are again repeated 
multiple times, but here the interval between the action and 
outcome is randomly varied. After each trial the participant 
gives their estimate of the time between the action and 
outcome. This estimate is then compared with the actual 
interval and the interval estimation error is calculated.  
This method is considered less robust than the Libet clock 
method. Another limitation is that it cannot distinguish 
where a binding effect may be occurring; i.e. is it an action 
or outcome binding effect? However, it has the benefit of 
requiring just one measurement for each action/outcome 
condition under observation. It is also suitable for use with 
a wider range of experimental tasks, including designs that 
involve significant visual elements. Overall this method is 
best suited to studies comparing binding effects across 
experimental conditions, rather than studies aimed at 
robustly measuring binding for a given condition. It is also 
well suited to studies comparing a larger number of 
experimental conditions - as is the case in experiment 2 
below. By comparing people’s mean estimation errors in 
different interaction conditions it enables empirical 
comparisons of the sense of agency in different conditions. 
We have now introduced two implicit methods through 
which people’s sense of agency - defined as the experience 
of control of actions and ownership of the outcomes of 
those actions - can be empirically investigated. Both 
methods make use of intentional binding, a phenomenon 
extensively examined in cognitive neuroscience literature, 
but not yet investigated or exploited in HCI research. In the 
following sections we present two experiments in which 
these methods have been used to empirically investigate 
peoples’ experiences of interactions with technology. 
EXPERIMENT 1 – WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE INPUT 
MODALITY CHANGES? 
At CHI 2010 Harrison et al. published an award winning 
paper on Skinput, a radical new input device that allows 
users to interact with technology by ‘appropriating’ their 
bodies, and more specifically their skin, as an input surface 
[20]. Once the device is attached to a person’s arm they can 
control a computer by tapping different places on their hand 
or arm. For the appreciative conference audience this paper 
gave rise to many questions. In particular, one audience 
member asked: “So, what’s it like to be a button?” 
Whilst this question may appear frivolous at first sight, we 
believe it taps into an important issue for the HCI 
community. In recent years researchers have developed a 
wide range of new interaction techniques and devices, 
investigating concepts such as embodied [11], affective [30] 
and brain-computer [14, 39] interaction. These new 
approaches offer the potential to dramatically reshape the 
experience of interacting with technology. The question 
“what’s it like to be a button?” challenges HCI researchers 
to think more deeply and provide a more rigorous 
understanding of these new experiences. 
Inspired by the work of Harrison et al., our first experiment 
provides an empirical investigation of the question “what’s 
it like to be a button”. More generally this experiment asks 
if changes in the input modality of an interaction can have 
an effect on the user’s sense of agency. As such, the 
techniques described in this experiment provide an 
empirical means of assessing and comparing the 
experiences provided by new interaction techniques. We 
compare a traditional input device - a keypad - with a skin-
based input device. 
Capturing skin-based interactions 
For the purposes of this experiment we did not require a 
skin-based device as complex as that described by Harrison 
et al. We did however require that our device be able to 
capture the user’s actions reliably, with a high degree of 
temporal accuracy and without requiring a training period. 
Our device, figure 3, bears a stronger resemblance to an 
earlier device described by Amento et al. [1]. A piezo-
electric contact microphone is placed on the user’s arm and 
connected to a computer through a high-fidelity external 
soundcard (Edirol UA-25EX). Vibrations in the user’s arm 
are monitored using this microphone and analysed to detect 
when the user taps on their arm. Following a process of 
refinement and testing we were able to detect gentle arm 
taps  with  a  reliability  of  greater  than  95%  and  with  no 
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Figure 3: a piezo-electric contact microphone is used to detect 
when the user taps on their arm. 
training required for new users. The overall capture device 
and software is sufficiently robust that users can move their 
arms and hands without triggering false arm taps. It has a 
temporal accuracy of less than 3ms. This is equivalent to 
the temporal accuracy with which the MAC used in our 
experiment reports button presses from our USB keypad. 
Procedure 
Figure 4 illustrates the overall procedure for trials in this 
experiment. As the task undertaken by participants does not 
involve a significant visual component, we make use of the 
Libet clock method. One independent variable is 
manipulated: the input modality. In condition 1 - the button 
press condition - participants press a button on a keypad to 
cause a beep. In condition 2 - the skin-based condition - 
participants cause a beep by tapping on their arm. The skin-
based capture device is attached to the participant’s left arm 
and they tap the inside of this arm with their right hand, 
(avoiding any sensitive carpal tunnel region), as in figure 3. 
There is a fixed interval of 250ms between the user’s action 
and the beep in both input conditions. 
Participants sit at a desk, with both arms on the desk in each 
condition. They face a computer screen showing a Libet 
clock. To initiate a trial they press a footswitch. The 
onscreen clock begins to rotate. Participants are instructed 
to allow the clock to rotate for a short while and then make 
the action (button press or arm tap according to condition) 
whenever they want to. They then report the time on the 
clock face for one of the four measures outlined in Table 1.  
The trial was repeated 40 times for each measure, with 
specific measures blocked together. A within-subjects 
design was used. Across the two input conditions this gave 
320 trials per participant (160 per input condition). The 
measurement blocks for each condition were grouped 
together and the order of the input conditions was alternated 
for odd and even numbered participants. The order of the 
measurement blocks was randomised within the input 
conditions, but was balanced for odd and even participants. 
This study was approved by the University of Cambridge, 
Computer Laboratory Ethics Committee. Participation was 
on the basis of written informed consent. The experiment 
lasted approximately 70 minutes for each participant.   
 
Figure 4: the protocol for the active conditions in our first 
experiment. Baseline conditions omit either the action or beep. 
  
 Action    
binding 
Outcome 
binding 
Total         
binding 
Button 6.81ms 
(45.6ms) 
36.11ms 
(45.46ms) 
42.92ms 
(67.43ms) 
Skin-based 29.66ms 
(42.84ms) 
79.82ms 
(91.23ms) 
109.47ms 
(74.54ms) 
 
Table 2: the mean action, outcome and total binding times for 
each input condition. Higher binding values indicate a greater 
sense of agency. Standard deviations in brackets. 
Participants 
Participants for this experiment were recruited through an 
email to a University bulletin board. 21 participants - all 
right handed and aged 20 to 40 - completed the experiment. 
Three participants were excluded from our analysis. In two 
cases our capture device did not work effectively. A third 
participant incorrectly interpreted the experimental 
instructions. Each participant received a £15 gift certificate. 
Results 
Table 2 shows the action, outcome and total binding effects 
for the button press and skin-based conditions. These values 
represent the overall means across 18 participants. (A more 
detailed breakdown of specific measurements is in an 
Appendix at the end of the paper.) To test the statistical 
significance of our results we first conducted a 2x2 repeated 
measures analysis of variance comparing participants’ 
action and outcome binding values across the two input 
conditions. The results F(1,17)=16,397, p<.001, indicated a 
significant difference within the data. We then conducted a 
Bonferroni corrected paired sample t-test, with a null 
hypothesis of no difference, to compare the total binding 
values. The result shows a significant difference in binding 
between the two conditions, t(18)=4.05, p<0.01. Overall 15 
of the 18 participants experienced greater binding in the 
skin-based condition than in the button press condition. 
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Two further paired sample t-tests were conducted to 
compare the baseline errors for the two input conditions. 
The comparison of baseline action errors gives t(18)= 
0.753, p=0.461, indicating no significant difference. The 
comparison of baseline outcome errors also indicates no 
significant difference, t(18)=0.477, p=0.320.  
Analysis and Discussion 
As the comparisons of baseline errors for the two input 
conditions indicate no significant differences, we can 
conclude that any binding differences between button and 
skin-based input are caused by differences in the active 
condition, i.e. the condition in which an action causes an 
outcome. With a fixed delay of 250ms between actions and 
outcomes participants experienced higher binding on both 
actions and outcomes for skin-based interactions. A total 
binding of 42.92ms was observed in the button input 
condition. It is worth noting that this value is consistent 
with the results of prior binding experiments that have used 
button inputs [19, 26]. In the skin-based condition 
participants experienced a total binding of 109.47ms. Given 
the correlation between intentional binding and the sense of 
agency, this experiment allows us to conclude that people 
experience a greater sense of agency when they interact 
with technology via skin-based input, as compared with 
traditional keypad input. 
We believe that the finding in this experiment has a number 
of important implications for HCI research. It provides 
empirical evidence that new interaction techniques can 
provide different experiences of control and ownership to 
those offered by traditional mouse or keyboard interactions. 
The methods described also provide an implicit means of 
quantifying this difference. We chose to assess two 
dramatically different input conditions. In future the 
methods described here can be used to assess and quantify 
the differences for a larger range of interaction techniques, 
including changes more subtle than those assessed here. We 
could for example assess the difference in interactions with 
a touch screen via a stylus versus direct finger interaction, 
or differences in interactions that incorporate techniques 
such as haptic, embodied or physiological input.  
In addition to comparing input techniques the method 
described here can be used to compare the different 
interaction experiences for a specific input technique when 
other conditions of the interactions change: e.g. when the 
user is experiencing different cognitive loads, when the 
environmental conditions of the interaction change or when 
different user groups interact with the same piece of 
technology. Greater consideration is given to these 
possibilities in our final discussion and conclusions section, 
but at this point we will move on to our second experiment. 
EXPERIMENT 2 – WHAT HAPPENS WHEN A 
COMPUTER HELPS OUT?  
Cognitive neuroscience experiments on intentional binding 
have typically examined voluntary and involuntary actions. 
From an HCI perspective, this might be considered an 
unnecessarily black or white disjunction. Many user 
interactions with technology are more intermediate. In 
particular ‘intelligent’ user interfaces often seek to interpret 
and act on the intentions of the user. The user’s actions are 
voluntary, but the outcomes may be assisted. Our second 
experiment is designed to investigate what happens to the 
user’s sense of agency when a computer interprets their 
intention and helps them to achieve their goal.  
Assistance from a computer 
Our experiment investigates agency in a machine-assisted 
point-and-click task. We chose this task because pointing is 
a basic and ubiquitous action in user interfaces. As a 
consequence, several pointing enhancement techniques 
have been designed and evaluated [2]. One of our primary 
concerns in designing this experiment was model 
simplicity. As this is the first study of machine-assisted 
binding we chose a machine-assisting pointing model with 
as few free parameters as possible. This allows us to 
manipulate the assistance given to participants, while at the 
same time having to change a minimum number of system 
parameters. In our experiment participants use a mouse and 
are asked to hit targets on the screen as quickly and as 
accurately as possible. Participants are assisted by an 
algorithm that has the effect of adding “gravity” to targets, 
causing the mouse pointer to be attracted to the spatially 
closest target. Our algorithm models horizontal and vertical 
movement but updates them independently of each other. 
Let ! be a horizontal or vertical component of the user’s 
mouse position and let !! be the corresponding horizontal 
or vertical component of the target position with the 
shortest Euclidean distance to the user’s mouse position. At 
each mouse position update from the user we compute a 
new corresponding horizontal or vertical component !′ 
according to the following model: 
!! = ! + !sgn Δ!! ! 1 + exp − Δ!!! , 
where Δ!! = !! − !. Since the algorithm is one-
dimensional it is applied twice: once for the horizontal and 
once for the vertical update of the mouse position. This 
model has ! and ! as two free parameters that can be 
manipulated to adjust the level of assistance participants 
receive. The parameter ! controls the extent of pixel 
movement towards the target that can be applied at each 
update. The parameter ! controls the degree of change of 
gain as a function of the distance to the target and typically 
models a range corresponding to expected differentials 
between initial mouse positions and target positions. In our 
experiment (see Figure 5) the distance from an initial start 
area to a target does not change and we use a fixed !-value 
of 800. This gives us ! as a single parameter that we can 
then manipulate to change the level of assistance 
participants receive in our task. Higher values of ! 
correspond to higher levels of assistance. 
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Figure 5: the overall procedure for the point and click task.  
Procedure 
Figure 5 describes the overall procedure for trials in this 
experiment. As this experiment involves significant visual 
elements we make use of the interval estimation method to 
implicitly assess people’s sense of agency. Participants sit 
at a desk facing a computer screen that is initially blank. 
They press a footswitch to start a trial. This causes a red 
start area to appear at the centre of the screen. Participants 
use a mouse to move the cursor into the start area. After 
waiting in the start area for a short period two green targets 
appear, one to the left and one to the right of the start area. 
The targets are equidistant from the centre of the start area. 
The participant is asked to hit one of the targets (an action) 
as quickly and as accurately as they can. Hitting a target 
causes a beep (an outcome), with a randomised time 
interval between hitting the target and the beep. The 
participant is then prompted to estimate the time between 
hitting the target and hearing the beep.  
Two targets are provided (left and right) as this allows the 
participant to make a voluntary choice in each trial. The 
computer has to interpret this choice before giving 
assistance. Participants are given a number of important 
instructions about the targeting task prior to the experiment: 
• Participants are told that there is no difference between 
the two targets. They can choose the target they want to 
hit in each trial. They are asked not to hit the same 
target each time or simply alternate between the targets.  
• Participants are specifically told that the experiment is 
not designed to test their reflexes. Participants are told 
not to move toward the green targets as soon as they 
appear. Rather they are told they can wait in the start 
area for as long as they want, moving toward their 
chosen target whenever they are ready. 
• Having begun the targeting action, participants are told 
to hit the target a quickly and as accurately as possible. 
It is important to note that we are not primarily interested in 
the speed with which participants can hit targets. Rather we 
are interested in differences in participants’ interval 
estimates when our independent variable - the assistance 
level - is changed.  
We tested four distinct levels of computer assistance: no 
assistance, mild assistance, medium assistance and high 
assistance. In the no assistance condition the gravity 
algorithm is not used and the computer gives the participant 
no assistance. In the mild assistance condition the ! 
parameter in the gravity algorithm is set to 3. In the medium 
assistance condition ! is set to 6. In pilot studies we found 
that many people were unaware of the different assistance 
levels given in these conditions. In both the mild and 
medium conditions the computer only assists the user if 
they are actually moving the mouse. In the high assistance 
condition the cursor moves quickly to a target once the user 
leaves the start area, even if the user stops moving the 
mouse. The ! parameter is set to 9. Our aim at this level 
was to make the assistance obvious to participants. Given 
the potential for ordering effects in this experiment, we 
chose to have 24 participants, thus allowing full counter-
balancing of the order of the four assistance level blocks. 
In designing this experiment we following the procedure for 
interval estimation experiments described by Ebert and 
Wegner [12]. The experiment has a within-subjects design, 
with each participant completing one block of trials for 
each of the four assistance levels. Rather than using an 
entirely random interval between actions and outcomes they 
recommend the use of three fixed intervals: 150ms, 400ms 
and 700ms. Participants are told that the beep interval is 
fully random and that it ranges from 50 to 950ms in steps of 
50ms. Each of three intervals - 150m, 400ms and 700ms - 
was randomly repeated 12 times per assistance level, giving 
totals of 36 trials in each block and 144 trials per 
participant. Participants use an input box with radio buttons 
to give their estimates of time intervals. 
Prior to beginning the experimental trials each participant 
undertook a short practice period involving 12 trials. 
Participants pressed a button on a computer screen. This 
triggered a beep and they estimated the interval between 
pressing the button and beep. They were then told the actual 
interval. In the practice trials the interval did vary randomly 
between 50ms and 950ms. These trials served multiple 
purposes. Firstly, they were intended to improve 
participants’ accuracy by giving them a better sense of the 
brief intervals used in the experiment. Second, by exposing 
participants to a full range of random delays, we aimed to 
reinforce their expectation that the experimental trials 
would also involve randomised delays. 
This experiment was run on a desktop PC running 
Windows 7. Participants used a Microsoft optical USB 
mouse. The pointer sensitivity was set to the default level 
for Windows 7, with enhanced pointer precision switched 
off throughout all trials. The red start area was 100 pixels 
high and wide. The green targets each had a diameter of 35 
pixels. We used a 24-inch widescreen monitor with a 
resolution of 1920x1080 pixels. The centre of each target 
was 810 pixels from the centre of the start area. Participants 
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were excluded if they repeatedly missed targets or if they 
hovered over targets for long periods before clicking them. 
Whilst this experiment was primarily focused on an 
empirical assessment of the sense of agency, participants 
were given an opportunity to comment on their experiences. 
Upon completion of each of the four blocks of trials an 
experimenter asked participants: “Did you notice any 
problems with that block of trials?” This question was 
deliberately open-ended and did not make any reference to 
agency or assistance from the computer. 
This study was approved by the University of Cambridge, 
Computer Laboratory Ethics Committee. Participation was 
on the basis of written informed consent. The experiment 
lasted approximately 50 minutes for each participant. 
Participants 
Participants were recruited through an email to a University 
bulletin board. In all 27 participants - all right handed and 
aged 20 to 40 - completed the experiment. Three were 
excluded from our analysis. Two participants hovered over 
the targets for long periods (>500ms) and one missed the 
target 18 times in one experimental condition. This left us 
with 24 participants, with the order of the experimental 
blocks fully counter-balancing for the four assistance levels. 
Each participant received a £15 gift certificate. 
Results 
Table 3 shows the mean interval estimation errors and 
standard deviations for each assistance level. These values 
represent the overall means across 24 counter balanced 
participants. Lower estimation errors indicated a higher 
sense of agency. To test the statistical significance of our 
results we first conducted a repeated measures analysis of 
variance that compared the interval estimation errors of 
participants across the four assistance levels. The result, 
F(3,69)=2.74, p=0.05, indicates a significant difference 
within the results. Bonferroni corrected paired sample t-
tests were then conducted between the successive assistance 
levels, with a null hypothesis in each case of no difference 
in the estimation errors. We do not find a significant 
difference between the no assistance and mild assistance 
conditions, t(24)=0.036, p=0.97. Similarly we do not find a 
significant difference between the medium and high 
assistance levels, t(24)=0.419, p=0.679. There is however a 
significant difference in estimation errors between the mild 
and medium assistance levels, t(24)=3.08, p < .01. 
Analysis and Discussion 
Prior to undertaking this experiment our initial expectation 
was that – if assistance from a computer did indeed have a 
measureable effect on peoples’ sense of agency – we would 
find a gradual effect, with successively higher levels of 
assistance leading to a successively lower sense of agency. 
The results paint a more complex and compelling picture. 
This experiment used interval estimation as an implicit 
metric for participants’ sense of agency. The results of    
our  experiment  indicate  a  high sense of  personal  agency 
 
No     
assistance 
Mild 
assistance 
Medium 
assistance 
High  
assistance 
-16.78ms -16.32ms 9.93ms 4.53ms 
(70.70ms) (82.03ms) (85.92ms) (79.54ms) 
Table 3: the mean interval estimation errors in milliseconds 
for each assistance level. Lower estimation errors indicate a 
greater sense of agency. Standard deviations in brackets. 
(negative estimation errors) in the no assistance condition, 
where participants completed the task on their own with no 
help from the computer. They also indicate a similarly high 
sense of agency when the computer gave them a mild level 
of assistance, with no significant difference in participants’ 
interval estimation errors at the no assistance and mild 
assistance levels. When the assistance level was taken one 
step further, to the level we have termed medium 
assistance, results indicate a significant loss in the sense of 
agency, as indicated by positive interval estimation errors. 
There was no significant difference between participants’ 
estimation errors at the medium and high assistance levels. 
Participants’ comments in response to our queries about 
problems after each block of trials strongly indicate that 
they were aware of differences between the no assistance 
level and each of the three assisted levels (mild, medium 
and high). This suggests that while participants were aware 
of the assistance from the computer in the mild assistance 
condition, they still experienced a high sense of agency.   
This overall result has a number of important implications. 
Firstly it shows empirically that, up to a certain point, the 
computer could assist users whilst also allowing them to 
maintain a sense of control and ownership of their actions 
and the outcomes of those actions. Secondly it suggests that 
beyond a certain level of assistance users experienced a 
detectable loss in their sense of agency. This experiment 
suggests that for this particular assisted input algorithm - 
and possibly for assisted input systems more generally - 
there may exist a tipping point or sweet spot. This is the 
point at which a computer can help people and potentially 
maximise task performance - e.g. speed or accuracy - 
without significant detriment to the experience of agency. A 
third important implication of this work is that the methods 
applied here can be used to map the personal agency 
characteristic of computer assisted interactions techniques. 
In this experiment we investigated four distinct assistance 
levels - with ! values of 0, 3, 6 and 9 in our gravity 
algorithm. In future experiments a more fine-grained 
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analysis - testing further intermediate ! values e.g. 1, 2, 4, 
and 5 - would provide a more detailed mapping of users’ 
sense of agency when interacting with the system. 
Our primary aim in this experiment was to investigate if 
changes in assistance from a computer led to 
experimentally measurable changes in peoples’ sense of 
agency. However, as was the case with the first experiment 
in this paper, we believe the methods described here have a 
broad range of applications. They could be used to compare 
different machine learning/user assistance algorithms. They 
could also be used to refine the parameters of a particular 
assistance technique or algorithm. As stated previously, we 
focused on simplicity in designing this experiment. One of 
our choices was to have an experimental design in which it 
was extremely unlikely that the computer would incorrectly 
interpret the user’s intentions and therefore hinder, rather 
than assist, them. In future we believe it will be interesting 
to use the techniques described here to investigate the 
effects on people’s sense of agency when ‘intelligent’ 
systems make mistakes and incorrectly interprets users’ 
intentions. For example, what quantifiable impact does a 
violation of the user’s intention have on their experience of 
control and, once lost, how long does it take before users 
recover their sense of control? It may also be possible to 
implicitly investigate techniques that mitigate losses in the 
sense of control. The methods described in this experiment 
can provide a valuable means of empirically addressing 
such questions and thereby help developers to make 
informed design trade-offs. 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Personal agency is a crosscutting experience essential to 
many aspects of our day-to-day lives.  It links to concepts 
such as control, ownership, responsibility and causality, and 
has a significant impact on how we perceive and interact 
with our world and with the people and things in it. In this 
paper we have sought to provide a new insight into the 
experience of personal agency as it relates to interactions 
with technology. In doing so we have drawn upon prior 
research in cognitive neuroscience and have introduced two 
implicit measures through which the experience of agency 
can be empirically investigated. These methods have been 
extensively investigated in cognitive neuroscience 
literature, but, prior to this paper, they have not been 
exploited in HCI research. 
Measurement and evaluation are key components of HCI 
research and practice. Measurement enables comparison, 
which enables us to make systematic improvements and 
consider trade-offs in the design of systems. Prior HCI 
research has provided a rich set of techniques through 
which many task performance aspects of system usability - 
e.g. efficiency, error rate, memorability - can be evaluated. 
In this paper we have demonstrated a means through which 
an underlying experience - the sense of agency - can be 
empirically investigated. Interfaces and interaction 
techniques that facilitate a high sense of personal agency 
are likely to have a strongly empowering effect for users. 
They will allow people interacting with technology to 
instinctively sense that “I did that”. 
Cognitive neuroscience research has demonstrated that the 
experience of agency is highly malleable. In this paper we 
have demonstrated two specific ways in which changes in 
interactions can significantly affect the user’s experience of 
agency. We believe this work has tapped into a research 
area rich in possibilities.  We chose to focus on input 
modality and assistance from a computer, and have offered 
specific examples of the future research questions in each 
area. However, a wide range of factors relevant to HCI 
research have been shown to have an effect on the 
experience of personal agency. For example, distortions in 
feedback or inconsistencies across different feedback 
modalities can be detrimental [15, 28] and it will be 
interesting to investigate and compare the impact of 
different feedback techniques on user agency. Uncertainty 
and contingency [26-28] also have an impact and are 
worthy of investigation in the context of HCI research on 
uncertain control [39].  
Implicit measures of the experience of agency will also be 
relevant to cross-population investigations of interaction 
experiences. For example, studies suggest that this 
experience changes across the lifespan. In particular older 
groups may experience substantial differences on their 
sense of agency [24]. It will be interesting to examine the 
design factors that maximise the sense of personal agency 
in such groups. Giving the growth in HCI research on 
health and wellbeing, and in research that addresses mental 
health [7] and seeks to support people experiencing 
psychotic difficulties [3], we believe the methods described 
in this paper can also play a valuable role in understanding 
the unique requirements of these user groups.  
Finally, this paper has focused on implicit measures for the 
sense of agency. Research in cognitive neuroscience has 
provided robust evidence for the validity of these methods 
and they have the benefit of enabling researchers to 
empirically assess the experience of agency as it happens. 
In future we also believe it will be interesting to combine 
these methods with subjective methods, in which users are 
explicitly asked to report on their experiences of control 
and ownership. This will allow us to provide a deeper 
understanding of users’ preferences regarding the 
experience of agency in human computer interactions. 
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APPENDIX: MEASUREMENTS IN EXPERIMENT 1 
 Action errors  Outcome errors  
Baseline  Active  Baseline  Active  
Button -4.10ms  2.71ms 16.46ms -19.64ms 
Skin-based 3.43ms 33.08ms 14.28ms -65.54ms 
Action binding button = 2.71 - (-4.71) = 6.81ms 
Outcome binding button = 16.46 - (-19.64) = 36.11ms 
Action binding skin-based = 33.08 - 3.43 = 29.66ms 
Outcome binding skin-based = 14.28 - (-65.54) = 79.82ms 
 
Table 4: baseline and active errors in the perceived timing of 
events in experiment 1. 
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